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Casual observations suggest that there may be large unrealized gains to poor people from
the sectoral reallocation of economic activity in underdeveloped economies.  For example, the
family of a petty trader in rural Bangladesh has on average a 50% higher consumption per person
than the family of a landless farm worker.  Lack of access to credit for setting up new enterprises
is often identified as the reason why these gains have not already been exploited. Credit market
failures are thought to be pervasive, and may entail large aggregate gains from successful efforts
at enhancing access to credit for starting rural non-farm enterprises. There are other reasons for
unexploited gains from non-farm rural development, including uninsured risk and imperfect
information. Traditional banks have not, however, had a good reputation for enhancing the
access of poor rural people to credit, or in dealing with other constraints on small-scale enterprise
development. 2 By this view, bank behavior is one cause of persistent poverty.
Micro-credit banks have emerged in a number of countries. Their espoused aims and
methods often appear to be more favorable to realizing any potential gains to the poor from
relaxing credit constraints, and providing supportive non-lending services, including better
information.  Group-based lending arrangements, such as used by a number of these banks, may
also help pool risks. Many of the new micro-credit banks, such as Bangladesh's famous Grameen
Bank, have said explicitly that their aim is to reduce poverty by mobilizing resources and
targeting credit and non-lending services to poor rural households for setting up new enterprises. 3
2  Introductions  to the issues  and literature  on these points can be found in Hoff and Stiglitz
(1993),  Besley  (1995)  and Lipton  and Ravallion  (1995, section  6.4).
3  See, for example,  Yunus  (1984),  Hossain  (1984), Getubig  (1992),  and Khandker  (1996).
2Are the traditional  banks really failing  to exploit  the potential  gains  to the poor from non-
farm  rural development? Is this new class of banks doing  any better? The answers  are unclear
on a priori grounds. It is not even  clear that there will be any real gains from facilitating  sector
switches. The higher levels of living of rural  non-farm  households,  compared  to farming
households,  may be due entirely  to heterogeneity  in characteristics  which  are conducive  to
success  in rural non-farm  enterprises,  such as education  or access  to urban  markets. Poor  farmers
may  well be the most credit  constrained-but  they may also lack the education  or other  attributes
which  allow a new entrant  to the non-farm  sector  to succeed. Credit  market failures  do not
necessarily  imply that efforts  to lend  more for non-farm  rural enterprises  will be pro-poor.
Controlling  for heterogeneity,  the supposed  gains may  well vanish. Or there may well  still be
large unrealized  gains,  but favoring  the non-poor,  leaving  the new micro-credit  banks with little
scope for helping  the poor.
This paper attempts  to assess  whether  banks are responding  to the potential  gains  to
Bangladeshi  farm households  from switching  to the non-farm  sector. To test for such a response
we study the placement  of bank branches.  In an underdeveloped  rural economy,  branch  location
is bound  to be an important  factor in determining  access  to credit.  While  other  relevant  indicators
might be identified  (such as a bank's attempts  at targeting  poor households  within a given area),
branch  location  also has the advantages  of being well  measured  and of being consistent  between
banks. By combining  information  on branch  location  with independent  household  survey  data,
we aim to better understand  the(potentially  diverse)  motives behind  bank behavior.
There appears  to have been  very little  previous  work on the location  decisions  of micro-
credit  banks. We know of only one previous  empirical  study,  namely  by Khandker  et al. (1995),
3also using data for Bangladesh. Their regressors were measures of accessibility, flooding and the
moisture content of the soil.  However, these variables had negligible explanatory power. In their
regression for Grameen Bank branches, none of the regressors were significant and the adjusted
R 2 was 0.04.  We suspect that the main reason for this poor explanatory power is the omission of
measures for the expected welfare gains from bank activity in different locations, as determined
by the relevant socio-economic characteristics of the customers living in each area.
We offer a method for estimating the unexploited gains from non-farm rural
development. The method allows us to collapse a potentially large number of determinants of the
gains from switching from farming to non-farm activities into a single measure, which can be
tested as an explanatory variable for bank branch location.  We find that this measure has
considerable explanatory power in understanding bank locations in Bangladesh.
Section 2 presents the theoretical model of branch placement which motivates our
empirical work.  Section 3 discusses our methodology, while section 4 describes our data.  The
estimated gains from sector switching are presented in section 5, while section 6 looks at the
their implications for explaining branch placement.  Section 7 concludes.
2  Theoretical  model  of branch  placement
To motivate our empirical work, we begin with a model of the optimal spatial allocation
of bank branches. We are clearly  dealing  with banks which  do not necessarily  aim to maximize
profits. We assume  that the bank maximizes  a weighted  sum  of expected  utilities,  where  the
weights  embody  the bank's distributional  goals. This characterization  of a nonprofit  bank's
welfare  objective  would  seem  to encompass  the objectives  that one would  expect to find in this
4setting. The stated objectives of the Grameen Bank (as in, for example, Yunus, 1984) suggest
that the weights on expected utilities are highest for the poorest, but decline as utility increases.
By contrast it is sometimes argued that the traditional banks are more concerned with the welfare
of rich patrons, which one could interpret as having lowest weights for the poorest.  As we will
see, a profit maximizing bank can also be interpreted as a special case of our model.
The model assumes two sectors, interpretable as "farm" and "non-farm", and it assumes
that the way in which access to a bank matters in this context is in fostering successful transitions
from farming to the better off non-farm sector, rather than by increasing the welfare of people
within a given sector. Also, while the bank has a number of instruments at its disposal, we focus
on just one of them, namely the geographic allocation of its branch offices.  More general models
could be formulated.  However, this simple model is adequate for motivating the empirical
specifications we will use later.
The number of customers the bank has in the j'th  area is denoted Nj.  This is assumed to
depend on the number of branches it has in that area, Bj, and on other geographic variables, Zj,
such as the density of economic activity, and of other banks.  This can be written:
Nj =  N(BJ,  Z)  (/=l,..,n)  (1)
We assume that higher accessibility to bank branches raises the number of customers (N. >O),  but
that it does so at a declining rate (NBB<O).
The bank does not, however, care about more customers as such, but rather about
aggregate welfare gains.  In this simple model, the welfare gains arise solely from successful
transition from farm to non-farm sector, whereby household i in areaj  reaches utility UNF,  while
5utility as a farmer  is U.,f  .The bank allocates  its efforts  so as to maximize  expected  gain  in social
welfare. Utilities  are weighted  according  to the bank's normative  judgements  on which
households  are more deserving. (For  example,  higher  weight  might be given  to poorer farm
households.) Expected  weighted  utility  in the farm sector in areaj is Ej[wyUQ/1,  while  it is
EJw,yU,N1  if transition  to the non-farm  sector  is successful. The expected  weighted  gain per
customer  in areaj is Ej[wjG,]>O  where  the gain  from successful  switching  is G, = U,NI';U,/.  The
weights  can also be interpreted  as probabilities  of success  in non-farm  activities,  or some
combination  of success  probabilities  and distributional  weights.
The bank's problem is then to choose  the allocation  of its branches  across  geographic
areas so as to maximize  the expected  gain in social welfare  from its lending  operations  without
exceeding a total cost of C.  The bank then chooses Bj (j=l ,..,n) to solve the problem:
n3  n
Max  E  Ej[w,G,]N(Bj, Zj) s.t. E  C(Bj, Zj)  '  C  (2)
_=_  j=I
where C(Bj,  Zj) is the cost of placing  Bj  branches  in areaj.  We assume  that marginal  cost is
positive (CB>0)  and non-decreasing  (CBB  2  0).
A unique  optimal  placement  of branches  exists  under  these assumptions,  such that
EJ[wyGJ]NB(Bj,  ZJ)  = ACB(Bfi  ZJ)  (3)
for all j, where  A  is the (positive)  multiplier  on the bank's budget  constraint.  We can re-write (3)
in explicit  form:
Bj = B(EJ[wG,jA-1,  Zj)  (4)
6Differentiating  (3), it is readily verified  that the function  B will be increasing  in the first
argument,  and increasing  (decreasing)  in Zj as long as NB  IC,B  is also increasing  (decreasing)  in 4
The above model  can be generalized  in a number  of ways  without  altering  the form of
equation  (3). For example,  in the above formulation  the expected  gain  from switching  sector
only enters  the problem  as a weight  on the number  of customers  in each area. Instead,  one could
allow  Nj to be also influenced  directly  by Ej[w,G]. This would still deliver  a solution  of the form
of (3), although  whether  Bj is strictly  increasing  in the expected  gain will depend  on the way in
which  it influences  the number  of customers  (if NB  is non-decreasing  in the expected  gain then,
keeping  the other  assumptions,  Bj  will be strictly increasing  in the gain).
One can also reinterpret  the model  to allow  a profit maximizing  bank. Ej[wyGy]  is then
the expected  profit in areaj, where  G. is profit from lending  to c.ustomer  i in j if there is nzo
default,  and w, can be interpreted  as a weight  determined  by both the bank's ex-ante  subjective
probability  of default  and default  profit  relative  to non-default  profit for each customer. 4 With
this change of notation,  expected  profit  is maximized  by branch  placements  satisfying  (3).
3  Measuring  the potential  gains from  rural  non-farm  development  by area
Our first step in estimating  an empirical  model  based on equation  (3) is to measure  the
potential  gains  to a household  from switching  sector.
For expository  purposes,  let us begin with a simple  case. Assume  that the weights  are
equal,  utility is given  by log consumption,  and that transition  to the non-farm  sector  entails that a
4 Let  djj  denote  the  expected  (ex-ante)  probability  of default,  and  let  Ij denote  the  profit  (or loss)
if default  occurs.  Expected  profit  is (1-  ttj)G,,+  d,jL,.  Then  w  l-d,jl-L,jIG.).
7randomly  chosen  farm household  becomes  a randomly  chosen  non-farm  household. Let the set
of households  in the non-farm  sector  be NF and let F denote  the set of farm households,  and let
the real consumption  of household  i in areaj be C,. Then  the expected  gain from switching
would  be E[logC, I  icNFI]-E[logC,  I i FJ, i.e., the mean proportionate  gain  in consumption.
However  one clearly  wants to relax  these assumptions,  so at to allow  unequal  weights,
other  determinants  of utility, and to allow for heterogeneity  in characteristics  conducive  to
success  in non-farm  enterprises.  We introduce  these features  below.
3.1  Consumption  gains at thefarm-household  level
We assume  that utility is a strictly  increasing  function  of log consumption  and of
household  characteristics  XJ (the same function  for all households).  We postulate  that
consumption  of household  i in areaj is determined  by:
l0gCy  =/NFXY  +eNFY  (iENF)  (4.1)
logC 0 =  /FXi  +  eFU  (iEF)  (4.2)
where  X. is a vector  of household  characteristics  (including  a complete  set  of dummy  variables
for geographic  areas),  PNF and 
1 F are parameters,  and eNF,  eF are error processes. Some  elements
of Xmay be altered  by the bank's lending;  we allow  this later,  but ignore it for the purposes  of
this exposition. Also, some  elements  in either of the parameter  vectors  fNF  and 8F  may be set to
zero,  to permit sector-specific  variables,  such  as occupations  only found in one sector.
Our aim is then  to estimate  the gain  to each farm  household  from an exogenous  switch  to
8the non-farm  sector, controlling  for the household's  characteristics,  given  by the Xvector. 5
Since we are controlling  for X., we can measure  utility gain by the proportionate  increase  in
consumption.  The gain  from a sector  switch  conditional  on X, is then given  by:
GY  = ( 8NF  `-F')X#  + E[eNF#  - eFI  Xt#  iEF  (5)
To estimate  this we use the consumption  model (equations  4.1 and 4.2) to predict what
consumption  level a farm  household  would  have in the non-farm  sector, given its value ofXand
unobserved  attributes  captured  by the residual;  all we change  is the sector. A farm-household
consuming  C. will consume  exp(logC,+G,) in the non-farm  sector.  Notice  that if there is no
sector-selection  bias then E[eNF#  - eFjIXo  iFI  in (5) can be set to zero; if there is bias then that
term can be estimated  using sector  bias-correction  terms (Appendix).
3.2  Weights
With enough  degrees  of freedom  one could  let the data determine  the appropriate
weights. However,  that will not be feasible  here. One option  is to set the weights  equally. But
this is clearly  too restrictive. Another  option is to use a poverty  measure  as the weight,  as would
be appropriate  for a bank such  as Grameen  which  claims  to be aiming  to reduce  poverty. A
simple, but defensible,  option  is to use poverty-gap  weights,  defined  as p,=(l-CU  YPG for C, <  I
withp,=  0 otherwise,  where  PG is the aggregate  poverty-gap  index,  PG=E[max(l-C,,  0)].6
5 If there  is sample  selectivity  then  this  vector  will  have  to be augmented  to include  any  variables
which  influence  sector  choice  but  not  consumption  given  sector;  see  the  Appendix.
6  Poverty-gap  weights  arise  naturally  when  the squared-poverty  gap,  SPG=E[max{(J-Cj)2,  0}],
is used  to assess  overall  poverty  impacts  since  PG  affects  the  marginal  impacts  on  SPG  of switching
9Normalizing the gains by PG assures that if the gains are the same for everyone then the poverty-
weighted mean gain will be the same as the ordinary (unweighted) mean gain. 7 For more
traditional commercial banks, poverty weights are implausible. However, the mirror image of
poverty weights may make more sense. This can be modeled simply by using l-p,i as the weight
for household i in areaj.
Combining these observations, we will test an encompassing model in which the
unweighted expected gain, Ej[G,], and the poverty-weighted gain, Ej[pyG,],  are included as
separate explanatory variables. This allows the data to determine which weighting scheme is to
be preferred.  If equal weights are appropriate then the unweighted gain, Ej[G.], will have a
significant positive coefficient, but the coefficient on EjIp,G,,]  will not be significantly different
from zero.  If only poverty weights are needed then the opposite will hold, and only E 1[p,G,] will
matter.  However, there are many combinations.  A poverty-oriented bank may  attach some
value to higher average gains (possibly a negative value, if it expects other banks will chase
those gains), as well as putting positive value on how pro-poor the gains are.  A traditional bank
may put lower weight on poorer households amongst the poor, so that one would then find that
the coefficients of Ej[G,J]  and Ej[p.G.] have opposite signs, with the former positive.
3.3  Remarks
(i)  In calculating Ej[w.G,.]  we assume that only a small randomly-chosen number of
sector;  unlike PG, SPG reflects  the extent of inequality  amongst  the poor (Foster et al., 1984).
'  To assure  comparability  across  sub-groups,  the PG used for normalization  is the aggregate  PG
for all farm households,  not the sub-group  values  by district.
10households  within some  target  group (all farm  households,  or a sub-group,  such as landless  farm
workers)  switch sector. Since  the number  of switching  households  is small we are  justified in
treating  the model  parameters  JJNF'and 
1 F'as fixed. (It is implausible  that the parameters  would
be unchanged  if a large  number  of farm households  switched  to the non-fann sector,  or that there
would  be no impacts  on existing  non-farm  households.)
(ii) Note also that the value of Ej[w,jG]  derived  this way is a function  of the  X. vectors  in
(5) for all iEF in the given geographic  area. One can thus interpret  our estimation  method  as a
means of collapsing  the number  of dimensions  of potential  explanatory  variables  into  just one
dimension. If there were no sector-selection  terms  then EJ[G,J]  would  be a weighted  mean of the
vector  of means,  Ej[XJ,],  with the weights  determined  by the #NF'  P  'parameters.  More generally,
there will also be distributional  weights  and nonlinearities  arising  from the selection  terms.
(iii) With sufficient  degrees  of freedom  one might prefer instead  to enter the vector  of
mean X.'s in the model  of branch  locations  without  any aggregation. (Although  sector-selection
effects  and distributional  weights  could introduce  considerable  nonlinearity.)  As we will see in
the next section,  we do not have sufficient  degrees  of freedom  (in either  the survey  sample  of the
geographic  data) to go this route. The above approach  does, however,  offer a defensible  method
of aggregating  the information  on a potentially  large  number  of explanatory  variables.
(iv) We will treat Ej[w,G,I  as exogenous  to branch  placement.  For the X,'s we will be
using (described  below),  this would  seem a defensible  assumption.  The alternative  would
presumably  be that higher branch  density  in an area reduces  the expected  gains, in which  case
our results  will underestimate  the impact  of the expected  gains  on branch  placement.
114  Data
For estimating the potential gains, our data consist of 3817 randomly sampled rural
households from the 1991/92 Household Expenditure Survey (HES) of the Bangladesh Bureau of
Statistics.  The consumption measure is comprehensive (including all market commodities, with
market-based imputed values when they do not entail market transactions).  Regional price
differences were taken into account by deflating nominal consumption by regional poverty lines
giving the estimated cost of basic consumption needs; for further details see Wodon (1996).
We use the primary occupation of the household head (whether male or female) to
classify households into the two sectors.  The HES provides data on occupations according to 31
categories.  To obtain sufficient sample sizes, these categories have been aggregated into five
farm groups and seven non-farm groups. The farm groups are: (1) landless agricultural workers,
(2) agricultural workers with land, (3) workers in fisheries, live stock, and forestry, (4) tenant
farmers, and (5) owner farmers. The non-farm groups are: (1) servants and day-laborers, (2)
transport and communication workers, (3) salesmen, service workers, brokers, and middlemen,
(4) factory workers and artisans, (5) petty traders and other small businessmen, (6) executives,
officials, professionals, and teachers, and (7) non-working heads (retired, unemployed, or
students). Table 1 gives summary data by sectors of employment.
Using the head's primary occupation as the criterion for the farm/non-farm classification
has its limitations.  It does not take into account the secondary occupation of the head, or the
occupations of the spouse and other household members, who may well be part of the non-farm
sector when the head is in the farm sector, or of the farm sector when the head is in the non-farm
sector.  However, the extent of such secondary "cross-sectoral" effects is small; only 19% of
12farm households defined by the head's primary occupation had a secondary non-farm activity (as
either a secondary activity of the head or an activity of the spouse), and only 7% of households
classified as being in the non-farm sector by our criteria had a secondary farm activity.
Banks such as Grameen  have relied heavily  on female  membership.!  It was not feasible with
these data to estimate a gender-specific measure of the gains from switching; there were only 180
female heads or spouses with occupations as recorded in the HES.
The survey data identify household location by 20 districts, and the data are
representative at that level.  One district (Chittagong Hill Tracts) did not have any observations
in the sample, and two were aggregated to contiguous districts for sample size considerations.
We thus have 17 areas in all.  Data on bank branches are also available by district.
5  Estimated gains from sector switching
Table 2 gives our estimates of the parameters of equations (4.1  )-(4.2), and their Huber-
WVhite  standard errors.  We include variables describing primary occupation, location, education,
land ownership and demographics. The Appendix gives our test results for sector-selection bias,
which indicate we can safely omit correction terms from the consumption equations.
Some of our specification choices were difficult. Including occupation dummy variables
raises a concern about possible endogeneity, although there is likely to be a trade off here with
8 This is not necessarily  because  of gender-specific  gains from setting  up new enterprises;  more
plausibly,  it is because  of the organization's  desire  to promote  female  empowerment  and because  women
appear  to be less likely to default. In any case,  we would  conjecture  that the gains from women  alone
shifting  to the non-farm  sector  will be highly  correlated  with the gains from  the head shifting,  as we have
measured  them.
13greater omitted-variable  bias in the other parameters  of interest  if we deleted  the occupation
dummy  variables  for this reason. We were also reassured  by our test results  on sector-selection
bias (Appendix). Some of our specification  choices  were determined  by data  limitations,  both in
terms of the variables  collected  by the HES and the survey's sample size (which  limits  how
finely one can identify  geographic  effects,  for example.) However,  there were other  variables
that one might want to include. For example,  we tested robustness  to a specification  which
included  secondary  occupations  (of the head, or spouse),  though  recognizing  that this is likely  to
raise further  concerns  about  endogeneity  (while  one might argue  that the primary  occupation  of
the head can be taken to be exogenous  to consumption  decisions,  this is clearly  more  problematic
for secondary  activities.) However,  only a few of the variables  describing  secondary  activities
were significant,  and the main results (described  below) on consumption  gains from switching
primary sector were very similar. We dropped  the secondary  activities  from all specifications.
Table  2 suggests  a number  of similarities  between  the determinants  of consumptions  in
the two sectors. For example,  better  education  and more land increase  per capita consumption,
while larger households  tend to have lower  per capita  consumption. The consumption  returns  to
owning  land are not significantly  different  between  households  who farm  land  themselves  and
those  who rent it out (recalling  that there is little secondary  farming  activity  amongst  primarily
non-farm  households). Similarly,  while  there are gains  to having  a better  educated  spouse,  they
are no different  between  the two sectors.  And the impacts  of most household  size variables  are
similar between  sectors. So none of these  variables  have a significant  impact  on the gain to a
farmer  from switching  to the non-farm  sector.
However,  there are a number  of sectoral  differences  in the process  determining
14consumption.  The returns to the head's education are significantly higher in the non-farm sector.
Having a better educated household head raises the marginal benefit to a farm household of
switching to the non-farm sector. The hypothesis that all non-occupation coefficients are the
same in both equations is rejected at the five percent level (Table 3).  Also, different geographic
factors are at work in the two sectors, since the area dummy coefficients differ significantly
between the two equations (Table 3).  We will discuss the geographic effects in more detail later.
We give our estimates of the average gain under various assumptions in Table 4.  These
are based on the regressions dropping the selection-bias term, and including occupation
dummies, as in Table 2.  In each case we give both the average differential in log consumption,
as well as the gains controlling for all other characteristics of the specific sub-group (all farm
households, or landless farm workers) as described above. The numbers under "unconditional"
do not use any controls; they are simply the differences in the sample averages for the relevant
groups. Comparing the conditional and unconditional numbers thus indicates the bias arising
from failure to deal with heterogeneity in hoasehold characteristics. To the extent that current
farm households tend to have characteristics which have lower (higher) returns in the non-farm
sector, the unconditional means will over (under) estimate the gains from switching.
The first row of Table 4 gives the estimated average gains for farm workers switching to
the non-farm sector. Without controlling for heterogeneity, the effects are substantially over-
estimated; the unconditional gain in consumption is 8.9%, as compared to the average gain
controlling for heterogeneity of 6.2%. Table 4 also gives results for a landless agricultural worker
shifting to the transport sub-sector or joining the petty traders.
The proportionate gains tend to be larger for poorer farm households. Figure 1 plots the
15gain against  initial log consumption.  (Since consumption  is normalized  by the poverty  line to
reflect spatial  cost-of-living  differences,  those  with negative  log consumptions  are poor.)  The
regression  line (indicated  in the figure)  has slope  -0.057  (standard  error of 0.0051).  The mean
proportionate  gain for the poor is 8.2% while for the non-poor  it is 4.3%.
It is clear from Tables  2 and 3 that the geographic  effects  on living standards  are not the
same between  sectors;  there are a number  of significant  differences  between  sectors  in the
coefficients  on the geographic  dummy  variables.  To assess  the gain from switching  to the non-
farm sector by area, we need to consider  the characteristics  of each farm  household  in that
district,  as well as the geographic  characteristics  of the district.  As before,  for each farm
household  we assigned  a probability  of working  in any of the non-farm  occupations  equal to the
observed  probabilities  for non-farm  households. Thus  we can interpret  the result as the average
expected gain  from switching  sector, by area.
The estimated  gains  by area are in Table  5. There are large geographic  differences. The
highest  unweighted  average  gain  is in Dhaka  where  we estimate  that a representative  farm
household  would  have 24%  higher consumption  in the non-farm  sector.  The lowest unweighted
gain is in Noakhali  where  consumption  would  fall by 4% on average. Table 5 also gives  the
unconditional  mean differences  in log consumption,  so as to assess  how far off this might be as a
guide  to the (conditional)  gains  from switching  sector. Figure  2 plots the mean gains  against  the
unconditional  ones by district. There is a positive  relationship,  though bias is still indicated,  with
a tendency  for the simple  (unconditional)  averages  to overestimate  the gains  at high levels but
underestimate  them at low levels.
We also give  poverty-gap  weighted  gains  in Table 5. There is a tendency  for poorer
16districts to be the ones with higher estimated gains; the correlation coefficient between mean
consumptions and the estimated gain is -0.44 which is significant at the 2% level.  However, the
district with the largest average gain, namely Dhaka, is one of the least poor areas.  Possibly this
reflects larger gains among some non-poor farm households.  To check this we also examine the
poverty-gap weighted average gains. The poverty-weighted gains are more strongly  correlated
with average consumptions by district than are the unweighted gains (Figure 3); the correlation
coefficient between the weighted gains and initial log consumptions per person is
-0.65 which is significant at the 0.5% level.  The three districts with highest weighted gain are
also the three districts with lowest mean consumption.
6  Implications for understanding the placement of bank branches
The above results suggest substantial geographic variation in the gains from exogenous
switching from the farm to non-farm sector.  So there may well be large welfare gains from
geographic targeting of efforts to promote the non-farm sector. We can now return to the
question we started with: To what extent does the existing geographic distribution of efforts to
promote the non-farm sector reflect the distribution of the potential gains? To address this
question, we use our estimates of the geographic variation in the gains from switching to the non-
farm sector to estimate a model of branch placement motivated by equation (4).
We have data on the distribution by district of the branches of the governmental banks
and the largest non-governmental bank in Bangladesh, namely the Grameen Bank (GB), which
provides credit for microenterprises targeted to poor rural households; Grameen accounts for
1717% of all bank branches. 9 In addition to Ej,[p,G,]  and Ej[Gjj (section 3.2), we include
population density; more dense areas will presumably generate higher demand for GB loans per
unit area, and may also entail a higher marginal cost to the bank.
Regressing GB density on these three variables we obtained the results in Table 6.  The
impact of the poverty-weighted marginal benefit on the spatial allocation of GB branches is
highly significant (a t-ratio of 4.14, which is significant at the 0.1% level).  The other two factors
hypothesized to influence local demand for GB loans are also significant.
Are similar factors at work in determining the geographic distribution of other banks?
The third column of Table 6 also gives the results obtained on regressing the density of other
"non-Grameen" banks on the same three variables.  While population density continues to have a
positive impact on bank density, the other two variables have reversed their signs; as expected,
higher values of the unweighted gain from sector switching attract other banks, consistently with
our interpretation of the result for GB density in Table 6.  However, the other banks are clearly
attracted by gains to the non-poor, as indicated by the (significant) negative coefficient on
poverty-weighted gain, controlling for the unweighted gain.
It is notable that, comparing the regressions in Table 6, the coefficients on poverty-
weighted gains and unweighted gains are roughly equal, but with opposite signs, for the two
types of banks. The restrictions that the coefficients on the weighted and unweighted mean gain
sum to zero is accepted for both regressions (a t-test gives a value of 0.615 for GB branches and
0.789 for other banks).  Columns 2 and 4 of Table 6 give the regressions when these restrictions
9  For fuller discussions  of how Grameen  Bank  works see Hossain  (1984), Khandker,  Khalily,
and Khan (1995),  and Khandker  (1996).
18are imposed. Figures 4 and 5 plot the densities of Grameen and other banks (respectively)
against the difference between the unweighted and poverty weighted gains from sector switching.
(In both cases, the restricted-form regressions in Table 6 have been used to control for population
density; bank branch density is the predicted value if each area had the same population density.)
So our results indicate a marked difference in the branch location decisions of Grameen
Bank versus the traditional governmental banks.  The potential gains from promoting sector
switching influence both types of banks, but they appear to evaluate the distribution of those
gains very differently. The implicit Grameen weights are highest for the poorest but decline as
consumption rises, becoming negative above some point and constant after the poverty line.'"
Our results for Grameen Bank are consistent with the bank's  stated objectives of reaching the
poorest rural households (as espoused by the Bank's founder; see Yunus, 1984).
By contrast, in the branch placements of "non-Grameen" banks, the relevant weights on
individual gains are lowest for the poorest, then rise until the poverty line, and are equal after
that.  The mirror reversal in behavior of the traditional banks is consistent with a view that these
banks put low priority on reaching the poor.  This suggests that the poor are perceived as bad
risks by traditional banks; the implicit default risk in the "non-Grameen Bank" regression
decreases as consumption rises until the poverty line is reached, above which it is constant.
Finally we note that our results cast considerable doubt on any assumption that bank
placement is random. Thus, evaluations of the welfare impacts of credit programs which employ
10 Recall  that w. = (I-C,,YPG for C. < I and wY  = 0 otherwise.  Therefore,  because  GB switches
away from districts  with higher  unweighted  mean gain,  the implicit  weights  become  negative  when
consumption  normalized  by the poverty  line exceeds l-PG, which is equal  to 0.88 for our data.
19that assumption for identification purposes can be questioned.
7  Conclusions
We have assessed whether bank branch placement in Bangladesh is consistent with the
pursuit of unrealized gains to the poor from non-farm rural development.  The main explanatory
variable we have tested is our own estimate of the gains to switching from the farm to non-farm
sector, based on independent household survey data.  Our estimation methods allowed for
heterogeneity in the prospects of being successful in non-farm activities, and included tests for
whether or not a process of endogenous self-selection was already at work.
We find that typical farm households in Bangladesh are both poor, and poorly endowed
in c1haracteristics  conducive to success in more profitable non-farm activities.  Thus, comparing
average living standards overstates the potential gains to switching from the farm to non-farm
sector. Nevertheless, we find that unexploited gains from switching exist, even after controlling
for a wide range of  household attributes, including education levels, landholding, demographics
and location.  Average consumption for a farm household would be about 6% higher in the non-
farm sector, and the proportionate gains tend to be largest for the poorest farm households. There
are striking geographic differences in the gains.  Across districts of Bangladesh, the average gain
(controlling for heterogeneity) varies from -4% to 24% of consumption. The highest average
gains from switching to the non-farm sector are not, however, in the poorest rural areas.
The geographic placement of bank branches is strongly influenced by the potential gains
from switching to rural non-farm activities.  But there is a marked difference in the way the
(private, nonprofit) Grameen Bank responds to the potential gains versus the traditional,
20govermnental, banks. While the traditional banks appear to be attracted by areas where the gains
favor the non-poor, Grameen is attracted by areas where the gains favor the poor.  This is
consistent with a difference in the objectives of the two types of institutions, with Grameen Bank
putting far higher weight on the potential for reducing poverty thought its lending operations.
21Appendix:  Tests for sample  selectivity  bias
Our data allow  us to control for a reasonably  comprehensive  list of variables  in X,
including  education,  landholding,  location,  demographics,  and occupation. Nonetheless,  there
could well  be omitted  variables  in the error  terms of equations  (4.1) and (4.2) which  also
influence  whether  a household  is in the farm  or the non-farm  sector. We used  the standard  test
for such bias, by postulating  that sector choice  is determined  by a latent  variable  (dropping  the  j
subscript  for area):
Si* =y'Wi  + vi  (Al)
which  gives  the net gain (or loss)  to living in the farm  or non-farm  sector  for each household,  as
a function  of a vector  of variables  Wij. We do not observe  S,j*,  but we do observe  whether  the
household  is farm (Sij=O)  or non-farm  (S,j=l);  Su  = 1 if Sij*  > 0 and Su  = 0 if S1*  < 0.
There will be selectivity  bias in our estimates  of the gains  from sector switching  if the
error term v in (Al) is correlated  with the error  terms of equations  (4.1) and (4.2). Following
common  practice,  we estimate  the selection  model as a probit, assuming  that the error term v is
standard  normal. The expected  value of the residuals  in (4.1) and (4,2) are then given  by:
E[eNFi  lXij,  Wij,  ieNF] = cov(eNF  ,v)(p(y'W 1 j)/4D(y'Wj 1)  (A2)
E[eFi  IXii,  Wij,  ieF] = -cov(eF,v)qp(y'Wij)/[l  -D('y'Wij)]  (A3)
where p  and D  are the density  and cumulative  density  functions  of the standard  normal
distribution. In shifting  a farm household  to the non-farm  sector, we must compute:
E[eNFij  -eFij |Xij, Wij,  ieF] = [COV(EF,V)-COV(eNF  v)]q>(y Wij)/[ I-¢(Dy  W3j)]  (A4)
If the estimates  of both cov(eF,v)  and cov(eNF,v)  are insignificant,  then there is no sample
correction  term to be included  in the gains  from  changing  sector.
The probit  estimates  are available  from the authors. The results  were fairly  intuitive.
22Households with better educated members have significantly higher probabilities of working in
the non-farm sector, while a higher level of land ownership is associated with a higher
probability of working in the farm sector. Households in the Dhaka district, with younger and
older heads, and non-Muslim heads also have a higher probability ofjoining  the non-farm sector.
The probit was then used to construct estimates of the expected values of the error terms in (4.1)-
(4.2) conditional on X and W, which are used to test for correlations between eNF and v, and
between eF and v.
We derive identifying restrictions from a life-cycle model of consumption smoothing
through participation in the rural non-farm sector." We postulate that as a farm household ages,
and the children reach adulthood, some of the children take over the farmn  (leaving the parents
supported by transfers and some non-farm activity, which may have been there all along, but was
secondary), while other children split away to take up non-farm activities (possibly new ones, or
possibly pre-existing secondary activities). Thus, at any one time, we will see a U-shaped
relationship between probability of being in the non-farm sector and age of the household head;
the middle-aged heads (with children not yet at earning ages) will be more likely to still be in
farming.  By this process of shifting between farm and non farm sectors according to stage of the
life cycle, combined with intra-family (inter-household) transfers, we assume that consumption
within each sector can be smoothed over the life-cycle.  Thus, while stage of the life cycle is an
important determinant of mobility across sectors within the rural economy, consumption within
sectors is successfiully  protected from life-cycle effects. We tried two versions of these life-cycle
identifying restrictions.  In the first, the vector W in the selection model included all variables in
X plus the age and age squared of the spouse. In the second we deleted age and age squared of
the head from X, but retained them in W.
Consistently with treating farm vs non-farm sector choice as endogenous, we also
estimated the consumption equations with and without the occupations dummies; since there are
no obvious instrumental variables, dropping the occupation dummies is the only option if one
'  On life-cycle/demographic  effects  on participation  in non-farm  activities  see Kimhi (1996).
Strictly identification  is possible  without  exclusion  restrictions,  given  the nonlinearity  in W.
23wants to treat them as endogenous.
We conducted four tests of sample selection, corresponding to the two identifying
restrictions and the two models with and without occupation dummies within the farm and non-
farm sector. The data are consistent with the identifying assumptions on life-cycle effects.  There
was a significant life-cycle effects in the probit for sector choice, with a U-shaped relationship
between probability of being in the non-farm sector and age of the head, in which the turning
point is at a mean age of around 40 years.  Yet, the coefficient estimates (not reported here) for
age and age squared of the head and of the spouse were insignificant in the consumption
regressions in both sectors in the models with sample correction terms.' 2
Turning to the sample selection test results, Table Al  gives our estimates of cov(eF,v)  and
cov(eNF,v)  .These are not significantly different from zero in the consumption equations in all
four cases considered. So there was no indication of sector-selection bias due to a significant
correlation between omitted variables in the consumption model and omitted determinants of
sector choice. We followed the recommendation of Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, Chapter
15) of dropping the sector-bias terms in this case.
12 We kept the age of the head and its square in the model without  sample  selection  reported  in
Table 2, and again,  the coefficient  estimates  of these variables  are not significant.
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25Table 1: Poverty profile by sector of employment in rural Bangladesh, 1991-92
Mean  Poverty
consumption  rate
(normalized  (%  below
by pov.line)  pov.line)
Farm sector
Landless farm worker  0.853  74.61
Farm worker with land  1.025  55.80
Fisheries/forestry/live stock worker  1.036  54.87
Tenant farmer  1.133  42.86
Owner farmer  1.345  30.30
Non-farm sector
Servant, day-laborer  0.968  61.75
Transport or communication worker  1.150  46.56
Salesman, service, broker, or middleman  1.034  54.62
Factory worker or artisan  1.053  59.20
Petty trader or small businessman  1.339  39.22
Executive, official, profess., teacher  1.573  16.20
Retired person, student, not working  1.311  36.04
Source:  Authors' computations  from Household  Expenditure  Survey  (HES).Table 2: Determinants of consumption
Farm  Non-farm  t-test o
sector  sector  equality
coeff-  st'nd.  coeff-  st'nd.
icient  error  icient  error
Constant  15.97  8.56  28.85*  10.39  -1.01
Occupation  of Head (Farm)
Agricultural  worker  with land  11.11  *  2.20  n.a.
Fisheries/forestry/live  stock  worker  16.13*  3.14  n.a.
Tenant  farmer  19.92*  2.43  n.a.
Owner  farmer  20.23*  2.32  n.a.
Occupation  of Head (Non-Farm)
Transportation,  communication  worker  n.a.  7.05  3.76
Salesman,  service,  broker,  middleman  n.a.  10.32*  3.99
Factory  worker,  artisan  n.a.  4.61  4.28
Petty trader, small businessman  n.a.  14.40*  3.50
Executive,  official,  professor,  teacher  n.a.  14.63*  4.32
Retired  person, student,  not working  n.a.  -0.98  3.92
District
Mymensingh  -11.22*  3.63  -30.45*  5.39  3.39
Faridpur  -21.29*  4.24  -40.12*  4.31  3.21
Tangail/Jamalpur  -24.14*  3.86  -33.83*  4.73  1.67
Chittagong  24.33*  4.29  3.33  4.42  3.39
Comilla  7.29  3.82  -13.87*  4.23  3.94
Sylhet  33.55*  3.80  8.24  5.07  4.43
Noakhali  10.41*  4.61  -17.33*  4.71  4.37
Khulna  -4.89  4.44  -27.75*  5.35  3.56
Jessore  8.50*  4.15  -10.78*  5.44  3.04
Barisal/Patuakhali  -9.50*  3.85  -33.02*  4.51  4.28
Kushtia  -3.33  4.72  -11.37  9.51  0.86
Rajshahi  -14.79*  3.74  -33.27*  5.26  3.12
Rangpur  -22.68*  3.54  -38.52  5.43  2.75
Pabna  -13.78*  4.72  -27.34*  4.91  1.95
Dinajpur  -3.41  4.21  -28.85*  5.74  3.88
Bogra  -9.68*  4.89  -31.67*  5.54  3.24Education  of Head
Below  class 5 (some primary  school)  4.20*  1.80  12.80*  2.64  -2.82
Class 5 (completed  primary  school)  5.91*  2.40  15.72*  3.19  -2.39
Class 6 to 9 (some secondary  school)  10.54*  2.84  21.21*  3.86  -2.42
Higher level (completed  secondary  school)  18.77*  4.87  25.99*  4.27  -1.21
Education  of Spouse
Below  class 5 (some primary  school)  5.95*  2.06  2.23  2.96  1.02
Class 5 (completed  primary  school)  11.15*  3.47  11.80*  3.43  -0.14
Class 6 to 9 (some secondary  school)  15.53*  4.30  17.82*  4.14  -0.39
Higher level (completed  secondary  school)  19.87  14.27  27.76*  9.04  -0.64
Household  member  with better  education
One level higher  than max (head, spouse)  8.22*  1.91  11.26*  2.77  -0.94
Two levels higher  than max (head,  spouse)  11.78*  2.72  17.39*  3.58  -1.26
Three levels  higher  than max (head,  spouse)  15.23*  3.06  18.84*  4.18  -0.67
Four/more  levels  higher  than max  (head,  4.40  4.13  24.16*  8.03  -1.96
spouse)
Land Ownership
0.05 to 0.49 acres  7.49*  1.93  7.36*  2.44  0.04
0.50 to 1.49  acres  13.33'  2.31  19.21*  2.97  -1.59
1.50  to 2.49 acres  22.82*  2.94  31.66*  3.98  -1.78
2.50 acres or more  38.13*  3.05  42.40*  4.16  -0.87
Demographics
Number  of babies  -20.56*  1.55 -19.50*  2.02  -0.41
Number of babies squared  2.93*  0.50  2.86*  0.59  0.08
Number  of children  -15.39*  1.32 -19.44*  1.80  1.81
Number of children squared  1.91*  0.29  2.49*  0.39  -1.10
Number of adults  -14.07*  1.94  -9.85*  2.05  -1.72
Number  of adults  squared  1.32*  0.21  0.57*  0.20  2.99
Sex of the head  -14.83*  7.26  -2.43  6.23  -1.46
No spouse,  married  20.43*  5.63  16.34*  6.31  0.59
No spouse,  single  7.60*  3.42  14.83  7.77  -1.11
No spouse,  divorced/widowed  10.56  6.13  -6.91  6.55  2.12
Age of the head  0.34  0.36  0.65  0.38  -0.63
Age of the head squared  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.47
Non Muslim  -3.48  2.27  -8.79*  2.71  1.51
Source:  Authors' computations  from HES.
Note: The dependent  variable  is 100  times log consumption  normalized  by the area-specific  poverty  line.
Standard  errors are corrected  for heteroscedasticity.  Observations:  2345 farm and 1472  non-farm.
Adjusted  R-  0.52 (farm)  and 0.46 (non-farm).  "n.a." denotes  not applicable. (*) indicates  significance
at the 5% level. Excluded  dummies:  Dhaka  district,  married head  with a spouse,  male household  head,
Muslim  religion, illiterate  head, illiterate  spouse,  zero  education  differential,  landless  household,  and
landless  agricultural  worker  (for farm)  or servant/day-laborer  (for non-farm).Table 3: Test of structural differences between the farm and non-farm regressions
RSS  Number of  F value  F test
restrictions  (5% level)
Unrestricted model  371.62  - -
All non-occupational variables  381.49  46  2.15  Rejected
Constant  371.72  1  1.03  Accepted
Non-geographic variables  377.12  29  1.90  Rejected
Household size variables  373.96  6  3.90  Rejected
Other demographics/religion  372.48  7  1.23  Accepted
Education of head  372.81  4  2.97  Rejected
Other education variables  372.31  8  0.87  Accepted
Land variables  372.20  4  1.46  Accepted
Geographic variables  375.57  16  2.47  Rejected
Source:  Authors' computations  from HES.Table 4: Estimated average  gains  to switching  from  farm  to non-farm  sector
Initial mean  Unconditional:  Conditional:
consumption  Average  Gain from switching
(proportion  of  proportionate  controlling  for
the poverty  difference  in  initial household
line)  consumption  (%)  characteristics  (%)
Farm  to non-farm  switch  1.016  8.90  6.18
(given  sector  occupation  distributions)
Agricultural  labor  without  land  to  0.787  27.97  15.89
transport  and  communication  worker
Agricultural  labor  without  land  to  0.787  38.48  23.24
small  businessman/petty  trader
Source:  Authors'  computations  from  HES.
Note: A value of 1.0 for initial  consumption  indicates  that on average,  households  in that sector or
occupation  are at the poverty  line.Table 5: Gains  by area,  with and without  poverty  weights
Initial log farm  Estimates  of proportionate  gains in consumption  from switching  to
consumption  non-farm  sector
(normalized  by  Unconditional  Average  gain at  Poverty-weighted
pov.line)  mean difference  in  given initial  gains at given initial
consumption  household  characteristics
between  sectors  characteristics  (%)
(%)  (%)
Dhaka  1.095  19.06  24.15  18.94
Mymensingh  0.974  4.39  6.65  9.13
Faridpur  0.880  -0.06  4.47  7.96
Tangail/Jamalpur  0.844  12.16  12.95  22.98
Chittagong  1.216  12.59  2.01  0.64
Comilla  1.140  4.77  4.84  2.15
Sylhet  1.533  -7.85  -1.76  0.01
Noakhali  1.138  4.19  -3.98  -1.58
Khulna  1.039  5.59  5.31  2.46
Jessore  1.158  8.14  6.15  6.24
BarisalUPatuakhali  0.974  6.24  2.26  3.42
Kushtia  1.074  26.08  15.21  14.62
Rajshahi  0.919  9.43  8.39  11.53
Rangpur  0.820  12.34  13.24  23.04
Pabna  0.830  17.17  15.72  24.29
Dinajpur  1.018  -8.25  2.08  4.66
Bogra  0.981  1.40  4.08  7.01
Source:  Authors' computations  from HES.
Note: A value of 1.0  for initial  consumption  indicates  that on average,  farm  households  in that district are
at the poverty  line.Table 6: Determinants of the branch placement
Density  of Grameen  Bank  Density  of governmental
branches  bank branches
Intercept  -0.753  -0.492  -2.635  -4.001
(0.769)  (0.617)  (3.141)  (2.867)
Poverty-weighted  gain  0.202  n.a.  -0.903  n.a.
from switching  to the  (0.049)  (0.154)
non-farm  sector
Unweighted  gain from  -0.236  n.a.  1.083  n.a.
switching  (0.101)  (0.267)
Unweighted  gain  minus  n.a.  -0.186  n.a.  0.820
poverty-weighted  gain  (0.031)  (0.201)
Population  density  1.128  0.986  5.579  6.327
(0.273)  (0.131)  (1.461)  (1.028)
0.609  0.598  0.866  0.858
Sources:  Authors' calculations  from table 6 and BBS for branch density  (1995a,  b). Bank  density
measured  as the number  of branches  per 100,000  acres, and population  density  measured  as
persons  per 100  acres. Gains  are multiplied  by 100.
Notes: Standard  errors in parentheses. 17 observations.Table  Al: Tests for sector-selection  bias
Cov(CNF,  V)  Cov(£F,  V)
First identifying restriction  3.85  5.85
With occupation dumnmies  (10.92)  (10.36)
Second identifying restriction  -3.50  -3.42
With occupation dummies  (6.12)  (6.15)
First identifying restriction  7.41  -2.13
Without occupation dummies  (11.02)  (10.55)
Second identifying restriction  5.52  -8.18
Without occupation dummies  (5.59)  (6.29)
Source:  Author's computations  from HES.
Note: Standard  errors in parentheses.  First identifying  restriction  is with age and
age squared  of the head  (but not of the spouse)  in the consumption  regressions,  and
second  identifying  restriction  is without  age and age squared  of the head in the
consumption  regressions.FIGURE  1:  INCIDENCE  OF  GAINS
[FARM  WORKER  SWITCHING  TO  NON-FARM  SECTOR]
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Extent  to which  gains  from  non-farm  development  favor  the non-poor
Note: Horizontal axis is unweighted gain minus poverty-weighted gain.
Bank density controls for population density.
FIGURE  5: DENSITY  OF OTHER  BANKS  AS A FUNCTION  OF
GAINS FROM  SECTOR  SWITCHING  BY AREA
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